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Abstract: The high growth rates experienced in Ireland over the last 10 years has
resulted in a tightening of the labour market which is reflected in the number of
unfilled vacancies reported by firms. At the same time wage inequality has increased
leading to greater demands being placed on the government to tackle social
exclusion. In response to these issues, recent governments have proposed a range of
policies involving direct intervention in the labour market. Effective implementation
of these policies requires careful monitoring and evaluation of their effects. This
paper examines the procedures currently available for evaluating labour market
interventions. The results of recent evaluations of minimum wages laws, reform of
the benefit system and changes in working-time conditions are used to illustrate the
methodologies involved.  The paper also describes the data requirements of these
methodologies and examines the currently available Irish labour market data in this
light.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Between 1990 and 1997 real GDP in Ireland increased by over 6 percent per-annum
on average.  The corresponding figure for the European Union as a whole was less
than 2 percent.  One consequence of these rapid growth rates has been a significant
tightening of the labour market.  This is reflected in the number of job vacancies
currently on offer and the reported difficulties that firms are having in filling these
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openings.1  A potential worry is that these pressures will fuel increased wage
demands, which if not matched by increased productivity may reduce the
competitiveness of Irish firms.  At the same time, however, wage inequality among
workers has increased (Barrett et al., 1997) and the share of output going to capital,
as opposed to labour, has also risen substantially (Lane, 1998).  These trends have
resulted in greater demands being placed on the government to deal with social
exclusion.
In response to both these concerns, recent governments have proposed a number of
policies that involve direct intervention in the labour market.  These include; the
proposed national minimum wage; reform of the unemployment benefit system with
tighter controls being placed on those receiving unemployment benefits in return for
greater assistance in obtaining work; and restrictions on the working week.  While
these policies may be well intended the predictions of economic theory concerning
their likely effects is often ambiguous.
Monopsony models of the labour market can predict higher employment levels after
small increases in the minimum wage.  A competitive model on the other hand
would predict job losses as a result of introducing a binding minimum wage.
Furthermore, these job losses would be concentrated among unskilled workers, who
are precisely the individuals the policy was supposed to help.2  With regard to
welfare reform we would expect that greater job search assistance would ease the
transition from welfare to work.  However, in doing so it may also lead to increased
wage pressure in the labour market which could in turn have a negative effect on
employment rates (Calmfors, 1994).
Alternative models of the labour market can also lead to ambiguities when
considering the effects of working time restrictions.  Imposing restrictions on the
standard working week may increase employment levels if more workers are
required to produce the same level of output.  However, by altering the composition
of the wage bill such a policy may lead to a substitution of hours for employees, a
substitution of capital for labour and a scale effect which would reduce the level of
output produced.  All of these effects would result in a fall in employment as a result
of the reduced working week. (Freeman, 1998).
It is clear from this that the effective implementation of these policies requires
careful monitoring and evaluation of their labour market effects.  The need for ex-
post evaluations is also reflected in the requirements of the Structural Fund
regulations, which require that European Community structural operations be
subject to appraisal, monitoring and ex-post evaluation.  However, conducting such
evaluations is not straightforward.  In this paper I examine the procedures currently
available for evaluating labour market interventions.  These include regression-
based procedures; procedures relying on data from controlled experiments and
procedures which make use of natural experiments.  Results of recent evaluations of
minimum wage laws, reforms of the benefit system and reductions in the standard
working week are used to illustrate the procedures.
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By highlighting the ambiguities in the theory and emphasizing the need for
empirical evaluation, I do not wish to give the impression that such evaluations
should be atheoretical.  Indeed, quite the opposite is true.  Throughout this paper it
will become evident that researchers who ignore available theory will have difficulty
in choosing the appropriate estimation technique and in constructing the appropriate
data on which to apply their estimator.  Furthermore, they will encounter problems
interpreting their estimates.
In section 2 of the paper I outline the basic problem facing researchers attempting to
evaluate the impact of labour market interventions, namely the problem of selection
bias.  Section 3 considers three alternative estimation procedures proposed to
overcome this problem.  I illustrate each with examples from recent research.
Section 4 discusses the data requirements of these procedures and analyses current
Irish labour market data in this light and section 5 summarises the main results of
the paper and offers some conclusions.
2. SAMPLE SELECTION PROBLEM
To understand the problems that may arise with evaluations consider a situation in
which there are two potential states: a treated state in which the intervention is in
place and an untreated state in which the intervention is absent.  Let YT denote the
potential outcome if the treatment is received and YC the potential outcome when it
is not.3  The impact of the intervention on person i in period t, ∆it, is given by:
∆it = YitT- YitC (1)
It is clearly not possible to calculate ∆it for each individual.  If an individual receives
the treatment we observe YiT but cannot observe YiC.  Alternatively the individual
does not receive the treatment, in which case we observe YiC but cannot observe YiT.
Formally, the observed outcome, Yi, is given by
Yi=Di* YiT + (1-Di)* YiC
where, Di is an indicator variable, taking the value 1 if the individual receives the
treatment and zero otherwise.  At any given time therefore we observe only one of
two mutually exclusive possibilities.
The same is true if we focus on the average gain or loss in the population E(∆).
While we can estimate E(YT) for participants using 1)( TY , and E(YC) using 0)( CY
(where the subscripts outside the brackets denote participation status), we cannot
observe either E(YC) for participants or E(YT) for non-participants.
The goal of the estimators discussed in this paper is to allow the researcher to
construct these unobserved counterfactuals.  If the treatment is universal one might
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use the outcomes prior to the implementation of the program (say at time t’) to
proxy for what would have occurred in time t if the program had not been
implemented.  In this case { )( tTY  = )( tY } and { )( 'CtY  = )( 'tY }.  Formally the
before-after estimator can be defined as:
'
^
tt YY −=∆ (2)
This estimator can be rewritten as :
)()( '
^
ttCtCt YYYY −+−=∆ (3)
The first term in the expression measures the parameter of interest.  Unless
0)( ' =− ttC YY  the before-after estimator of this parameter will be biased.  This
latter term represents the selection bias for this estimator and arises because of
differences between the true and proxied counterfactual outcomes.  If governments
find it easier to implement legislation during economic recoveries we might expect
0)( ' >− ttC YY , in which case the before-after estimator would overestimate the
impact of the legislation.
 Figure 1: Alternative Programme Evaluation Estimators
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We can illustrate this using Figure 1.  Since treatment is universal we can ignore the
line labelled control for the moment. In keeping with our earlier conjecture we see
that the prior to the introduction of the legislation the outcome variable (Y) had been
increasing for several periods.  In the absence of the treatment we would have
expected output to reach E by the time of the evaluation (in our earlier notation E
represents tCY ).  As a result of the treatment we observe the outcome B ( )tY .  The
impact of the program is (B-E).  The before-after estimator uses outcomes prior to
the introduction of the legislation (for example A ( 'tY )) to proxy for the unobserved
counterfactual.  In this instance the before-after estimator would be given by (B-
A)>(B-E).  The distance (E-A) measures the bias.
If the program is voluntary we might consider using non-participants to proxy for
the unobserved outcomes.  In this case we might estimate the average gain for
participants in the program as:
01
^
)()( CT YY −=∆ (4)
where the subscripts “1” and “0” outside the brackets again denote participation and
non-participation respectively.  This cross-section estimator can be rewritten as:
])()[(])()[( 0111
^
CCCT YYYY −+−=∆ (5)
The first term in this expression is the average impact of the treatment on the treated.
The second term represents the selection bias for this estimator.  Again the bias
arises because of differences between the average outcome of non-participants and
the outcome we would have observed for participants if they had not participated.  If
more motivated individuals participate in training, for example, we would expect
this latter term to be positive.  In this case comparing participants and non-
participants would overestimate the impact of the program.  Looking at Figure 1 we
see that participants (labelled treatment) have uniformly higher outcomes than non-
participants (labelled control) even prior to the legislation.  The cross section
estimator would estimate the average effect of the treatment on the treated as (B-D)
which again in this model is greater than the true effect (B-E).  In this model the
selection bias is measured by (E-D).
In the next section of the paper I will discuss alternatives to the simple before-after
and cross-section estimator, illustrating each with examples from current research.
In doing so it will become clear that all of these estimators are based on identifying
assumptions, many of which may be difficult to test.  In order to choose between
competing estimators it may be necessary to turn to theories explaining the
underlying process.
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3. IDENTIFICATION STRATEGIES FOR EVALUATING LABOUR
MARKET INTERVENTIONS.
3.1 Social Experimentation.
A key to estimating the impact of a program is the construction of plausible
comparison groups.  Social experiments solve this problem by creating a random
control group of individuals who would have, under normal circumstances, been
affected by the treatment but who were prevented from receiving the treatment by
the evaluators.  Recent examples of the use of social experiments to evaluate labour
market interventions can be found in Card and Robins (1998), Ashenfelter et al.
(1998), Dolton and O’Neill (1995, 1996a, 1996b, 2002), Ham and LaLonde (1996),
Gorter and Kalb (1996), Johnson and Klepinger (1994), Davidson and Woodbury
(1993) and Decker (1994).  Earlier examples include Burtless and Hausman (1978),
LaLonde (1986), Corson and Nicholson (1985), Corson et al (1989) and
Johannesson and Persson-Tanimura (1978).4   Surveys of this approach can be found
in Burtless (1995), Meyer (1995) and Heckman, LaLonde and Smith – henceforth
HLS (1999).
To see how social experiments work, consider a program in which participation is
universal.  Let (Yri)1 and (Yri)0  denote outcomes in the presence of random
assignment of participants and non-participants respectively.  The social experiment
estimator of the average treatment effect is given by :
01
^
)()( rrr YY −=∆ (6)
This estimator identifies the treatment effect provided that:
)Y - Y(])(Y - )Y[( T0
r
1
r
CEE = (7)
This assumption rules out systematic changes resulting from the process of
randomisation itself.5   If assumption (7) holds the average treatment effect can be
estimated by comparing the randomised control and treatment groups.
To illustrate this approach consider the recent study by Dolton and O’Neill (2002)
who use experimental data to analyse the impact of the Restart unemployment
program in the United Kingdom.  The Restart program consists of a compulsory
interview for the long-term unemployed with an official of the Employment Office.
The aim of this interview was to reduce individual welfare dependency.  The Restart
process combines positive help and encouragement given to the unemployed job
seekers by way of advice, counseling and direct contact with employers, with tighter
enforcement of the conditions necessary to qualify for Unemployment Benefit.
We examined the impact of Restart by comparing unemployment outcomes for a
treatment group with those of a randomly chosen control group for whom participation
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in the process was postponed for six months.6  An important feature of the Restart
experiment was the ability to match the experimental data with the Joint
Unemployment and Vacancies Operating System (JUVOS) data collected by the
Employment Service.  This allowed us to construct monthly work histories for each
individual in the sample over a 15-year period, as a result of which we could track
individuals for 5 years after the end of the experiment.
The availability of data prior to the commencement of the experiment also allowed us
to examine the validity of the randomization procedure.  Average unemployment rates
for both the treatment and control groups are presented in Figure 2.  Randomization
took place in April 1989 (indicated by the first vertical line on Figure 2).  To test the
validity of the random assignment we compare unemployment rates prior to April 1989.
A comparison of the unemployment rates prior to 1989 reveals no significant
differences between the two groups.
 Figure 2: Unemployment Rates for the Control and Treatment Groups in the
Restart Experiment (1982-1994)
Under assumption (7) we can estimate the impact of Restart by comparing average
unemployment rates for the treatment and control groups after April 1989.7  To focus
on the long-run effects of Restart we compare average unemployment rates in 1994,
five years after the original experiment.  By this stage the unemployment rate for
individuals excluded from the initial Restart interview was 6 percentage points higher
than those receiving the treatment.  We used these estimates to conduct a cost benefit
analysis of the Restart program.  This showed that the introduction of the scheme
resulted in significant savings for the government.
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These results are consistent with the conclusions of others (Calmfors (1994), Meyer
(1995a) and HLS (1999)), all of whom suggest that counseling and job search
assistance, targeted at the long-term unemployed, provide a cost effective way of
increasing job-finding rates.  Our findings indicate the impact of these programs persists
in the long run.  Previous concerns that these programs simply initiate a circular flow of
individuals through the benefit system8, are not supported in our data.
These findings have implications for Active Labor Market Policies in Ireland (ALMP).
A recent OECD study (OECD, 1996) ranks 14 countries based on spending on ALMP.
The table distinguishes between different types of spending, including spending on job
search assistance, training and subsidies.  Of the 14 countries Ireland ranked third in
total spending on ALMP, with total spending amounting to approximately 1.3 percent
of GDP (Sweden (2.18%) and Denmark (1.86%) were the top two).  However, when
we look at spending on job search assistance, Ireland was only ranked 9th out of the 14
countries.  Our findings indicate that a redistribution of existing funding may be a more
efficient use of the funds.9  Calmfors (1994, page 37) reaches a similar conclusion for a
broad range of countries:
“Counseling activities and job search assistance, should probably
be given a greater weight in such a [ALMP] portfolio, since a fair
amount of evidence seems to indicate a favourable impact on job-
finding rates, and serious adverse side effects appear unlikely.”
The experimental approach to program evaluation has been the subject of substantial
debate and some of the limitations of the approach have been discussed in recent studies
(Heckman and Smith (1995), HLS (1999) and Blundell (1999)).  In analyzing
experimental evaluations it is important to realise that other estimators share some of
the problems associated with experiments.  Blundell (1999) cites the expensiveness of
experiments as a drawback.  It is true that experiments tend to be rare and can be
expensive to implement.  However, a large proportion of this cost does not reflect the
cost of randomization but rather the cost of data collection (HLS (1999)).
A major problem with non-experimental evaluations of ALMP is that often the
constructed comparison groups do a poor job of proxying the required counterfactual.
HLS argue that the best solution to this problem is to obtain better data.  They point out
that obtaining this data may prove to be almost as expensive as conducting an
experimental evaluation.  Thus when comparing estimators of similar quality, it is not
clear, a priori, which will be cheapest.
Two other features of social experiments have been criticised (Heckman and Smith,
1995). Firstly there is the possibility that treatment group members drop out of the
program before receiving the treatment and secondly there is the possibility that some
control group members may receive treatments that are close substitutes for the
experimental treatment (substitution bias).  Again, however, neither of these problems
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is unique to social experiments.  There is no evidence that the rate of dropping out is
higher in an experimental setting than a non-experimental setting.10
It has been suggested that experimentation increases the likelihood of substitution bias
by creating a pool of individuals who expressed a desire to receive the treatment but
were randomized out of the treatment in the experiment.  However, this is not likely to
be much of a problem for evaluations of new treatments, such as the Restart
experiment.  In the Restart experiment almost all of the treatment group recalled getting
the letter inviting them to the interview (the first stage of the Restart process).  Almost
80 percent are recorded as having attended a Restart interview and less than 2percent of
the control group are recorded as receiving a Restart interview.
In accessing social experiments it is also important to distinguish between problems
arising from the experimental process itself, and those unique to specific experiments,
arising from poor design.  Heckman and Smith (1995) note that 90 percent of training
centers refused to participate in the experimental evaluations of the Job Training
Partnership Act (JTPA) in the U.S.  This can lead to geographical biases in the final
estimates and may also contaminate the randomization procedure if eligibility
requirements for the program are relaxed to ensure a sufficiently large sample.
However, we found little evidence of such problems in the Restart experiment.  Every
Employment Service office throughout Britain was contacted while constructing the
sample and there was no scope for local employment offices to opt out.  By only having
a small proportion of the total office caseload participate in the experiment (about 1 in
100 of those interviewed over a period) the Restart design also minimized the extra
burden placed on staff as a result of the experiment.
Keeping the proportion of participants low in each center also reduces the potential for
training officials to manipulate the services in favor of the treatment group (the
‘creaming’ effect).  In an ideal design, officials would not know the identity of those
taking part in the experiment.  In the Restart experiment, however, counselors knew the
identity of those taking part in the experiment.  Nevertheless, we are confident that
there was little scope for creaming.  White and Lakey (1992) note that because the
participants accounted for such a small proportion of the total number of clients, this
meant that pressures of the caseload left little scope for Restart counselors to give
special treatment to those in the experimental sample.
While some of the problems associated with experiments are shared by other
approaches and some can be overcome by careful design of the experiment there are
some limitations that are specific to the experimental approach, which are difficult to
overcome by appropriate redesign of the experiment.
While the experimental approach may be suitable for analysing the average treatment
effect in a population it is not suited to answering questions about the distribution of
these gains.  A training program that increase average wages by 5 percent may result
from a situation where every participant gains by 5 percent or one where half of the
participants gain by 15 percent and half experience a fall in their wages of 5 percent.
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Social experiments cannot distinguish between these two possibilities.  The problem
arises because average impacts may be estimated using the marginal distribution of
outcomes for the treated and untreated.  These can be obtained from social experiments.
However, a distributional analysis requires knowledge of the joint distribution of
outcomes in the treated and untreated state, which is not provided by the experimental
approach.
Heckman and Smith (1995) and Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997) demonstrate
how to bound individual elements of a frequency table from knowledge of the marginal
distributions.  To examine the width of these bounds I use the Restart data for 1994, 5
years after the completion of the experiment.  The proportion of the treatment group
employed at this stage was 0.692, while the proportion of control group members
employed was 0.632.  However, the estimated bounds on the proportion of employed
workers who moved out of employment as a result of the scheme is [0.06,0.368].
Unfortunately these bounds are quite wide which means we cannot distinguish between
a situation where Restart helps many people back into work but also harms the
employment prospects of others, and one where Restart helps fewer individuals but
harms nobody.  The former seems unlikely given the nature of the Restart program.
For training programs, however, there is some evidence of locking-in effects (Calmfors,
1994), whereby individual search intensities may be reduced during the periods of
program participation with detrimental effects on employment prospects.  For
policymakers interested in the distribution of these gains, experimental evaluation
procedures may be of limited use.
It may also be difficult to use social experiments to analyse training programs that
involve several distinct components.  If the program is successful it is often difficult to
ascertain what component of the program was most valuable (Meyer 1995a).11  In
theory it is possible to overcome this problem by distinguishing between different
components in the randomization process.  In practice, however, this is not always
straightforward.  In the Washington experiment analysed by Johnson and Klepinger
(1994) different combinations of eligibility checks and job search assistance were
assigned to different treatment groups.  However, many individuals received the letter
inviting them to the jobsearch workshop prior to their scheduled Eligibility Review
interview.  Even though these individuals were to be excluded from the eligibility
check, it seems as though many of them perceived the jobsearch invitation as a further
work-test and reacted accordingly.  This may have biased the cross-component
comparisons of the experiment.
Finally social experiments provide no information on the process governing
individuals’ decisions to participate in the scheme.  It has often been noted that adult
unemployed males are less likely to participate in training programs than younger males
or females.  Even if experiments provide an unbiased estimate of the effect of the
program on participants they provide no information on why adult males fail to enter
the program or how best to alter the program to encourage participation.  These are
important questions and ones which policy makers may be interested in answering.12
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Given the advantages and limitations of social experiments what role should they play
in program evaluation?  It is my view that carefully designed experiments provide a
straightforward way of obtaining clean estimates of the average treatment effect.  They
are best suited to analysing new projects, as opposed to ongoing projects and the stage
of the process at which randomization takes place may have important consequences
for what can be learned.  In designing experiments, data should be collected from a
large number of centers, keeping the proportion of participants in each center small.
While this may increase the administrative costs of conducting the experiments, it has
the advantage of limiting the incentives for creaming and at the same time increasing
the probability of participation for a given center.  However, even a well-designed
experiment may have little to say about distribution or participation effects.
Policymakers interested in these issues will have to supplement the experimental
evidence with alternative estimates.
3.2 Difference in Difference Estimator (DDE) and ‘Natural’ Experiments
An alternative to carrying out controlled randomized experiments is to look for
examples of experiment-like situations occurring naturally.  This is the logic behind the
‘natural experiment’ literature and the `difference-in-difference’ estimator that is
commonly applied in these circumstances.  To see how the estimator works assume that
there exists a control group, denoted by 0. Also assume we have data before and after
the intervention. Retaining the notation from section 2, let 1'
^
1 )( tt YY −=∆  denote
the before-after difference in outcomes for those who receive the treatment and
0'
^
0 )( tt YY −=∆  denote the average difference in outcomes for the comparison
group. The difference in difference estimator is defined as:
)(
^
0
^
1
^ ∆−∆=∆DD
The key identifying assumption underlying this estimator is that any differences
between the control and treatment groups, in the absence of the legislation, is time-
invariant.  This implies that the average change in outcomes, in the absence of the
intervention, is the same for participants and non-participants.13  We can illustrate the
DDE using Figure 1.  The distance (B-E) gives the true impact of the legislation.  The
first part of the difference in difference estimator is simply the before-after estimator for
the treatment group (B-A).  The line AE denotes what would have happened to the
treatment group in the absence of the legislation.  To obtain the true treatment effect we
would need to subtract (E-A) from (B-A).  However, under the identifying assumption
of the estimator (E-A)=(D-C).  Thus the treatment effect can be estimated by (B-A)-(D-
C).
Examples of studies using the DDE include Card (1990), Eissa and Liebman (1996),
Katz (1996) and Hamermesh and Trejo (2000), while Meyer (1995b) provides a
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detailed discussion of natural experiments and the difference-in-difference estimator.
However, the best-known recent study may be the work of Card and Krueger (1994) on
minimum wages.  Their treatment group comprised of fast-food restaurants in the state
of New Jersey, while the control group comprised of similar establishments in the
neighbouring state of Pennsylvania.  In April 1992, New Jersey’s minimum wage rose
from $4.25 to $5.05, while legislators in the state of Pennsylvania kept the minimum
wage constant.  Card and Krueger use the DDE to compare employment, wages and
prices at stores in New Jersey and Pennsylvania before and after the minimum wage.
They concluded that increases in the minimum wage had only a negligible effect on
employment.14
For these estimates to be reliable it is essential that the treatment and control groups
satisfy the identifying conditions required for the estimator.  Changes in
macroeconomic conditions may not affect all groups in the same way and it is crucial to
bear this in mind when implementing the procedure.  Situations where treatment group
members anticipate the intervention and act accordingly or where the intervention takes
effect only with a significant lag may also cause problems.  Furthermore not every law
change is a good natural experiment and simply labeling a source of variation a ‘natural
experiment’ does not ensure that the variation is exogenous.
Figure 3: Full-Time Employment Levels for Newfoundland and Nova Scotia
 (1992-1994)
To illustrate these points I consider a recent change to the legislation governing the
standard working week in Canada.15  In 1993 the province of Newfoundland introduced
a 40-hour standard working week for all employees.  Any hours worked in excess of the
standard working week must be paid and overtime premium.  The standard came into
force on December 31, 1993.  As far as we can establish the motivation behind this
legislation seems to have been the removal of industry-wide discrepancies in the
standard work week rather than an attempt to increase employment.  The neighbouring
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province of Nova Scotia already had a 40 hour standard working week for all
employees which was not changed.
These circumstances seem to provide an ideal opportunity to study the effects of
reductions in the standard working week.  It seems reasonable to treat the change in the
standard working week as exogenous.  The change in hours was pronounced (from 44
to 40 hours).  The retail sector in Newfoundland was already subjected to the 40
working week and thus could potentially be used to control for time invariant
differences across states.  Finally aggregate data on employment; hours and wages on a
monthly basis were readily available.
The data for full-time workers in both states are presented in Figure 3.  It would be
difficult to reject the DDE identifying assumption based on these data.  Although there
are differences between the two states these differences appear to be constant.  The
`difference-in-difference’ estimates for these data indicate that the legislative change
reduced employment by 1,106 workers, corresponding to an hours’ elasticity of -0.06.
This very small elasticity is consistent with recent work on hour’s legislation (Hunt,
1999) and suggests that contrary to much popular belief such laws are unlikely to have
a significant effect on employment levels.
 Figure 4a: Distribution of Hours Worked in Newfoundland in 1994
The flaw in this experimental design only becomes apparent when one analyses the
micro data on hours worked available from Statistics Canada.  Figures 4a and 4b plot
hours worked per week in Newfoundland before and after the legislative change.  In
both cases we see a significant spike in the hours distribution at 40 hours.  It appears
that even prior to the official change in the standard week many workers in
Newfoundland were already working a 40 hour week.  What our original estimate
shows, therefore is that a law that does not affect anyone has no effect.
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 Figure 4b: Distribution of Hours Worked in Newfoundland in 1991
We can also use employment levels within the construction industry in both states to
further illustrate the potential difficulties with DDE.  These data are plotted in Figure 5.
As before the pre-legislation data would suggest that the identifying conditions needed
for the DDE are satisfied.  For this sector the `difference-in-difference’ estimate of the
employment effect implies an elasticity of over +1.  This estimate implies that
reductions in the standard working week have the potential to significantly increase
employment.  However, we already know that the legislation affected very few people,
so this cannot be so.  It must be the case that the hours legislation is proxying for some
omitted factor which had differential effects on employment in Newfoundland and
Nova Scotia.
Figure 5: Employment Levels in the Construction Industry
for Newfoundland and Nova Scotia 1992-1994
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This example provides a clear illustration of some of the pitfalls associated with the
DDE and highlights a central theme of Meyer’s (1995) survey.  While natural
experiments can provide a straightforward procedure for evaluating labour market
interventions with modest data requirements, the researchers cannot experimentally
control the variation being used in these studies.  In this case it is essential that they
understand the source of this variation. The preceding example shows that this is not
always straightforward.
3.3 Regression Based Approaches
While both randomized and natural experiments are being used more frequently in
recent evaluations, the most common approach to estimating labour market
interventions is based on traditional regression approaches.  There exist several studies
summarising these approaches (Maddala (1993), Friedlander, Greenberg and Robins
(1997), Vella (1998)).  In this section I provide a brief overview of the regression
procedures available, emphasing the relationship between these approaches and the
estimators discussed earlier.  These procedures center on the estimation of a system of
equations describing the intervention.  We can illustrate these approaches by examining
training schemes.  If participation in a training scheme is voluntary and the returns to
training are homogeneous then the training process can be described by the following
system of equations.16
iiii uTXY +++= δβα (8.1)
iii eWT += γ* (8.2)
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The first equation describes the outcome for individual i.  The remaining equations
describe the training participation decision.  T* is a latent variable describing training
propensity and Ti reflects the binary training decision.  Selection bias arises here
because of correlation between Ti and ui.  As a result the ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates of δ are biased.  This arises because OLS mistakenly attributes variation in Y
resulting from variation in ui to the regressor, Ti.
There are two channels through which this correlation may arise.  Firstly Wi and ui may
be correlated.  This type of selection model is called Selection on Observables.
Alternatively ei and ui may be correlated, in which case we have Selection on
Unobservables.  There have been a number of estimation procedures developed to deal
with these situations.  When selection is based on observables consistent estimates of δ
may be obtained by including the W variables in the outcome regression.  It can be
shown that rather than including all of the W regressors in the outcome equation, it is
sufficient to include only a particular function of the Wi, called the propensity score.
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This is simply the probability of treatment conditional on Wi.   A more flexible
estimator that uses the propensity score to match individuals is the Propensity Score
Binning technique (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)).  This estimator allows for the
treatment affect to vary across discrete partitions of the sample and can be estimated
with almost no functional form assumptions.  This approach has been used by Dehejia
and Wahba (1999) and Conniffe et al. (2000) to evaluate training programmes in the
U.S and Ireland respectively.
When selection is based on unobservables the proposed solutions are more complex.
One popular estimation strategy used in this instance is the Instrumental Variable (IV)
approach.  The instrumental variable approach relies on obtaining a variable (Zi) which
is correlated with Ti but uncorrelated with the error term in the outcome equation, ei.  In
carrying out the estimation only the variation in Ti explained by Zi is used to produce
the estimate.  The instrumental variables approach is currently the center of an ongoing
debate.17  Heckman (1997) shows that the conditions necessary for consistent IV
estimation of the average treatment effect are quite restrictive when the returns to
training vary across individuals.  Verifying these conditions is difficult and requires
detailed knowledge of the participation process (Heckman and Robb 1985).  When
these conditions are not satisfied the IV procedure estimates a weighted average of the
individual returns where the weight is proportional to the causal effect of the
instrument.  Instruments that focus on particular groups, therefore estimate the marginal
return for this specific group, which may be higher or lower than the average treatment
effect.
A common alternative to the IV approach is the two-stage procedure developed by
Heckman (1979).  Heckman showed that this problem could be reformulated within the
standard omitted variable framework.  In this case the omitted variable is the mean of
ui, conditional on individual i’s participation decision.  Heckman’s proposed solution
was to estimate the variable giving rise to the specification error (the conditional error
terms) and to include this in the outcome equation.  Estimates of the conditional error
terms are constructed from the estimated parameters of the participation equation
(8.2).18
Estimation of the participation decision is also of interest in its own right and may
provide answers to questions of concern to policy makers.  As noted in Heckman
and Smith (1995) policymakers may be interested in the effects of factors such as
subsidies, local labour markets, family income, race age and sex on program
participation decisions.  The estimated participation equation based on observational
data provides a framework for addressing these issues.  One could examine some of
these issues such as subsidies within an experimental setting by randomly varying
the levels of subsidy in the eligible population and then allowing voluntary
participation.  However, the need to have voluntary participation within ranges of
the subsidy makes the resulting population unsuitable for estimating treatment effect
and such designs have rarely been used in experimental evaluations.  Designing an
experiment which would allow us to look at both participation and treatment affects
would require a second stage randomisation among applicants within each stratum
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of subsidy.  While this is something that should be considered in designing random
experiments such a move would obviously add another layer of cost and complexity
to the experiment.
The conventional regression approach can also be modified to allow the impact of the
treatment to differ across participants.  If we assume that the gain to treatment δi is
independent of the base state, YtC, we can formulate the model as a random coefficient
regression model.19  When estimated this model allows us to retrieve the distribution of
gains across individuals.  An advantage of this approach, therefore, is that it allows one
to address the distributional aspects missing from randomized experiments.
While estimation of structural models eliminate the need for experimental data, this is
achieved by restricting the range of plausible models.  The two stage approached
outlined above requires an additive, separable model relating regressors to outcomes
and also an additive error structure.  The model postulated in 8.1-8.3 assumes that we
have a continuous outcome variable (such as earnings) and that the censoring appears in
the selection equation.  Consider, however a model where censoring occurs in both the
primary and the selection equation. We can write this system as follows:
Yi*=α + βXi + δTi + ui (9.1)
Ti* = γWi + ei (9.2)
Yi=1 if Yi*>0, Yi=0 otherwise (9.3)
Ti=1 if Ti* >0 , Ti=0 otherwise. (9.4)
The second stage (9.2) is similar to (8.2).  However, the first stage differs, in that the
primary equation is censored rather than continuous.  We only observe whether an
individual is employed or not (Yi), which is related to an individual’s employability,
Yi*. Yi*, however is unobserved.  In the absence of selection bias both these models
can be estimated using traditional methods, such as a probit or logit model
(Amemiya 1981).
If the errors are correlated, however, this procedure is not valid.  The model could be
estimated using maximum likelihood procedures if a joint distribution for the error
terms is specified.  As it stands, however, it is not valid to estimate this model using
the traditional two-stage approach.  Non-linearities in the traditional two-step
approach can alter the error distribution of the primary equation.  This will cause
difficulties for second stage estimators that are based on specific distributional
assumptions.20.  Many of these traditional regression approaches to program
evaluation are available in statistical packages such as Stata or Limdep.  As a result
there is a tendency to apply these procedures without giving sufficient thought to the
structure of the underlying model or data.  The example provided above illustrates
the problems this can cause.
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In a recent study Heckman et al. (1998) showed that the traditional bias in program
evaluations could be decomposed into three sources.  The first source of bias occurs
when it is not possible to match individuals in the treatment group with individuals in
the control group with similar characteristics.  The second source of bias arises if, for
those individuals that can be matched, the distribution of X differs between the two
groups.  The final type of bias captures selection on unobservables.
The relative magnitude of each of these components of the bias can be informative in
deciding on which estimator is best suited to the evaluation.  Combining experimental
and observational data, Heckman et al. (1998) show that although the bias resulting
from selection on unobservables is large relative to the estimated treatment effect, it is
relatively small compared to other components of the bias.  They conclude that better
data for modeling participation decisions and outcome variables can help a lot in
evaluating ALMP.  Unfortunately these findings do not establish whether better data
can help for broader types of interventions.  Would controlling for aggregate measures
of demand and supply eliminate the potential bias in time series studies of the minimum
wage?  If not would other data help and where might these data be found?  In the
remainder of this paper I outline some of the key data sets available for studying Irish
labour market interventions.  I also highlight some issues, which if tackled, would
further facilitate the evaluation of labour market interventions in Ireland.
4. DATA
In describing the available data I distinguish between primary data sets which are
collected with a specific evaluation in mind and secondary data sets which are collected
for purposes other than program evaluation but which often prove useful in conducting
evaluations.  I begin with the latter type of data.21
4.1 Secondary Data Sets
The largest publicly available household data sets in Ireland are the Household Budget
Surveys (HBS) and the Labour Force Surveys (LFS).  The main purpose of the HBS is
to generate weights that can be used in constructing price indices.  However, the micro
data also contain information on employment, income and expenditure.  To-date micro
data sets for 1987 and 1994 have been made available by the Central Statistics Office.
These contain information on 7,705 and 7,877 nationally representative households
respectively.  Examples of studies using the HBS include Nolan and Callan (1994) and
O’Neill and Sweetman (2002), Van de gaer, Funnel and McCarthy (1999) who use the
HBS to study inequality in Ireland, McCarthy (1998) who studies tax reform and
Madden (1999) who examines the measurement of poverty.
The HBS is a valuable source of information on labour market and social issues and the
public release of the micro data represented an important development in the analysis of
labour market phenomena in Ireland.  However, there are a number of features that
make it less suitable for studying specific labour market interventions.  At present the
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HBS is only carried out every seven years, only information on the head of household
have been made available22 and only very aggregate information regional information is
available.  There are plans to conduct future surveys on a 5 year cycle.  While this move
is to be welcomed, the 5 year window between surveys will still constrain potential
users of the data.  In contrast, the U.K. Family Expenditure Survey (FES) is a
continuous survey that has been in existence since 1957.  Individual micro data are
available from the U.K data archive at Essex to all bona fide researchers.  For a recent
study that uses the FES to analyse labour market issues, see Harmon and Walker
(1995).
Furthermore the HBS data are cross-section and contain only limited retrospective data
on labour market issues.  As noted by HLS “[when evaluating ALMP] it is important to
draw the treatment and comparisons groups from the same local labour markets. In
addition, recent evidence suggests that labour force status dynamics represents an
important determinant of participation in job training programs.”  In this context the
absence of detailed regional data and the lack of a dynamic component in the HBS data
restricts their potential for evaluating labour market interventions.
The Labour Force Surveys (LFS)23 consisted of a nationally representative survey of
approximately 47,000 households undertaken in April/May each year.  The LFS was
official data source for the construction of unemployment statistics in Ireland.  LFS
microdata files are available from the CSO from 1994 to 1997.  These data sets have
been used to analyse unemployment duration, non-employment and unemployment
dynamics in Ireland (see Murphy and Walsh (1996, 1997)) and to construct comparison
groups for the evaluation of government training schemes (Deloitte & Touche and
Murphy, 1998).
This latter study illustrates some of the problems facing researchers conducting labour
market evaluations on currently available data.  The Deloitte & Touche and Murphy
(DTM) report evaluated the Community Employment (CE) scheme.  The CE scheme
provides temporary, part-time, employment for the long-term unemployed and the
socially excluded.  It is the largest single programme operated by FAS – Training and
Employment Authority. Employment records for CE participants were obtained from
the 1996 and 1997 FAS Follow-up Surveys which were conducted by the ESRI.  To
construct a control group, data from the 1993, 1996 and 1997 LFS surveys were used.
Comparing members of this control group with CE participants indicated that the
employment rates for male CE participants were at least 6.5 percentage points higher
than for similar unemployed males.  However, the properties of the constructed control
group are open to question.
Because of the cross-section nature of the LFS data, DTM were forced to introduce a
correction for state dependence - the fact that exit rate from unemployment declines
with time spent unemployed – to estimate the employment rates for control group
members who were usually unemployed 20 months earlier.  Unfortunately, our
understanding of the extent and nature of state dependence is limited and any
allowances for it must necessarily be somewhat ad hoc.  Furthermore it is unclear as to
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the extent to which the limited characteristics available for construction of the control
group in the LFS account for all possible selection biases.  Finally, DTM acknowledge
that because training status is not coded in the LFS it is possible that some members of
the control group may have been on FAS schemes.  This makes it difficult to interpret
their final estimates.
In September 1997, the Annual Labour Force Survey was replaced by the first in a
series of Quarterly National Household Surveys.  Information is collected continuously
throughout the year, with 3,000 households surveyed per week giving a total of 39,000
households each quarter.  Households are asked to take part in the survey for five
consecutive quarters and then are replaced by other households drawn from the same
local area.
The introduction of the QNHS represents a significant development in the collection of
labour market data in Ireland.  While there have been some changes to the
questionnaire,24 the content of the QNHS is for the most part similar to LFS.  However,
in a changing labour market more frequent information is needed and the QNHS gives a
comprehensive picture of the labour market four times a year.  The ability to match
individuals across quarters also provides researchers with a basis for performing more
dynamic evaluations.25
Another important development in the QNHS is the possibility of including
supplemental questionnaires with the main survey.  The 1998 June/August quarter had
a module on housing, while the September-November quarter had a module on crime
and victimisation.  Survey supplements have been successfully included in the Current
Population Surveys in the U.S and have been the source of some interesting studies of
labour market issues (see, for example, Vroman, 1991)).  If these supplemental
questionnaires are to fulfill their potential it is important that researchers are involved in
developing the modules.  In this light it is encouraging to see that the review of the
National Statistics Board (1998) notes that “... a process of wide consultation will be
used to ensure that these social modules provide the most valuable data possible.”
While consultation with pre-desiginated groups of experts is important, other forms of
involvement should be considered.  A call asking researchers to submit proposals
suggesting ideas for supplemental questionnaires, to be considered on a competitive
basis and subject to cost considerations, would mark an exciting development in
research in labour economics in Ireland.  Such provisions currently exist in other
countries.  Since 1993 The Panel Study of Incomes and Dynamics (PSID) in the U.S.
has held open competitions among researchers to add supplemental questions to the
PSID.
In contrast to the household-based surveys described above the unit of analysis in both
the Census of Industrial Production and Forfas panel survey is the firm.  The Census of
Industrial Production provides a detailed picture of the structure and activity of industry
over time.  Short-term indicators of trends in industrial production, turnover,
employment and earnings are published regularly to monitor current developments.
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Unfortunately these data cannot be accessed outside the CSO.  The Forfas data are
publicly available and have been used by Walsh, Strobl and Barry (1998) to analyse job
flows in Irish economy.  While these data contain useful information on firms very little
detailed information is provided on employees.
As well as these data sets, there exist other Irish data sets containing important labour
market information.  The most notables of these are the Living in Ireland Surveys.  The
Living in Ireland Surveys comprise the Irish element of the European Community
Household Panel and are conducted by the ESRI.  The surveys are annual, the first
taking place in 1994 and contain detailed socio-economic information on a
representative panel of individuals.26  Recent work by O’Connell (1999) uses the LIS
surveys to carry out a control group analyses of 14 training and temporary employment
schemes implemented by FAS.  His main finding is that of the 14 schemes examined, 5
seem to have a significant impact on the probability of reemployment.  These include
the Employment Incentive Scheme, Employment Subsidy scheme, Enterprise
Allowance, Specific Skills Training and Job Training programmes.  The Community
Employment scheme, however, appears to have no significant effect on reemployment
prospects.27
O’Connell uses the LIS panel data to construct a control group.  For each individual in
the data set there is a longitudinal record of their work histories.  There is no need,
therefore, for the type of state dependence corrections used by DTM.  However, as
noted by the author members of the LIS control group are substantially older than the
participants, significantly more likely to be married, less highly educated and have
spent more time out of the labour force.  These differences are accounted for by
controlling for variables such as age, marital status and education in the outcome
equation.  However, if such differences exist between the two groups on the basis of
observable characteristics then we would not be surprised if similar differences were
also present in terms of unobserved characteristics.  To allow for this O’Connell uses a
two-stage Heckman approach.  However, as we noted earlier this approach restricts the
range of plausible models and requires identifying restrictions which are often difficult
to find.  These difficulties are apparent in O’Connell’s study in that controlling for
selection bias reduces the employment effects by a margin of perhaps one-third, yet
tests for selection effects fail to reject the hypothesis of no selection bias.  These
findings suggest that the underlying model may be misspecified.
A problem for other researchers wishing to use the LIS is the fact that the data are not
easily accessible.  The European Statistical Office (Eurostat) coordinates the production
and distribution of the ECHP.  ECHP data access conditions and prices (Marlier (1999))
are prohibitive and have been criticised in recent work by Jenkins (1998).  If these data
are to be used to their full potential it is vital that universal access to micro data be
provided to all bona fide non-commercial users (subject to registration and license
agreements) at a nominal cost.28  This may involve a greater role for national data
archives in distributing data (Jenkins 1998).  The establishment of the National Social
Science Data Archive, which is a joint venture between UCD and the ESRI, is a
welcome development in this respect.
198
4.2 Primary Data Sets
In some situations it may not be possible to use existing data sets to carry out the
required evaluation.  In these cases it might be necessary to collect new data.  Primary
data sets are becoming more common in the study of labour market issues and have
been used in studies of homelessness (Freeman and Hall 1986), disadvantage (Freeman
1990), education (Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994) and the low wage labour market
(Greene, Machin and Manning 1996), Card and Krueger (1994), Neumark and Wascher
(1997).
The data sets used by Card and Krueger and Neumark and Wascher have been the
subject of many debates29, which have tended to focus on issues concerning the merits
of personal versus telephone interviews, strategic response and biased sampling.
However, an important lesson to be learned from the minimum wage studies is the need
to recognize the underlying economic theories when collecting data.  Much of the
debate surrounding the minimum wage studies could be dispensed with (or at the very
least replaced by a more constructive form of debate) if these data had included
information that would allow us to understand how the labour market works.  Recent
work by Nolan, O’Neill and Williams (1999) represents an attempt to collect such
information.  The focus of their study was the national minimum wage being of £4.40,
which was introduced in Ireland on April 1st 2000.  In late 1998 Nolan, O’Neill and
Williams (1999) undertook a survey of private establishments to obtain details on
employment structure by hourly pay rates and the extent of vacancies, hirings and
departures.30  To avoid potential biases all questionnaires were completed on a
personally administered basis, which involved an interviewer paying a visit to each
respondent and completing the survey on site.
The information from the survey of firms was used to estimate the numbers of workers
affected by a national minimum wage of £4.40.  Our estimates indicate that
approximately 21 percent of all private sector employees received an hourly wage of
£4.50 or less.  This is consistent with estimates obtained from household based surveys
(Nolan (1999)).  We believe the survey will also play an important role in the future
monitoring and evaluation of the impact of the minimum wage.  We plan to interview
these firms again after the minimum wage is introduced, which will allow us to
determine how they have been affected by the legislation.
Earlier I argued that primary surveys should be designed so that the information
obtained can be used to improve our understanding of the labour market.  This requires
an understanding of the economics of the problem.  A key feature of recent monopsony
models of the labour market is the rigidities that may exist in the labour market.  Search
frictions and turnover costs are often used to justify these rigidities.  With this in mind,
our survey included a range of questions on vacancies, hirings and departures of
workers within establishments by pay range.  Including these questions will allow us to
establish the extent to which these rigidities exist for the type of workers affected by the
minimum wage.  They will also allow us to examine the role these factors play in
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determining the impact of a minimum wage.  It is only by understanding the labour
market processes underlying both the hiring decisions of firms and labour supply
decisions of workers that we can satisfactorily make sense of the employment effects of
previous studies.
4.3 Future Developments?
Linked Employer-Employee Database
The existing data sets described in section 4.2 tend to focus almost exclusively on
individuals or on establishments.  However, the outcome of labour market interventions
often depends on the interaction between employers and workers. In these cases, data
sets that exclude either one or other of these groups can only provide partial and
possibly misleading answer to the problem being studied.  One solution is to develop
linked employer-employee data sets (Hamermesh (1990, 1999), Leonard (1999),
Manser (1997).  Having a data set with broad detailed questions on the nature and
structure of firms, combined with accurate detailed information on the workers within
these firms creates the potential for developing greater insight into the operation of the
labour market.
An example of a matched employee-employer database is the 1998 U.K. Workplace
Employee-Employer Relations Survey (WERS).  The WERS 98 Panel Survey dataset
contains data from interviews conducted with management respondents at the same
establishment in both 1990 and 1998.  Furthermore self-completion questionnaires were
distributed to a random selection of up to 25 employees in each workplace.  The
majority of these data are available from the Data Archive at the University of Essex.
A bibliography of research based on each of these surveys is available from the
WERS98 Data Dissemination Service web-site.31
Linked employer-employee data sets would also facilitate a greater understanding of the
impact of policies such as the minimum wage or changes in standard hours.  The impact
of these policies is determined by the interaction of employers and workers and is best
understood by a data set which reflecting this.  The prospect of matching a survey of
firms, such as the one described in Nolan, O’Neill and Williams (1999), with detailed
individual information would significantly enhance our understanding of the labour
market.
While the benefits of linked data sets are evident, such an effort could only be justified
if a framework could be developed which would allow improved access to confidential
micro establishment data.  The sponsors of WERS98 achieve this by withholding a very
small fraction of the data collected in separate data files.  Access to these files is
restricted, until a time to be agreed.  These files are only released with the explicit
permission of the sponsors.  Providing access to the information contained in the
restricted files could lead to the identification of individual workplaces and individual
respondents.  So as to guard against this, the WERS sponsors have decided that users
must: (a) give a considered account of why they need information contained in the
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restricted files over and above that contained in the general release; and (b) provide
details on the steps that will be followed to preserve the anonymity of the data.  These
restricted files contain data on the regional location of the establishment and its detailed
industrial activity (a broad, one-digit industrial classification is available on the general
release files).  With the exception of these data the remainder of the WERS data are
available through the data archive.32
Live Register Data Panel
While interventions such as minimum wage legislation are likely to have their largest
effect on employees other legislation, such as welfare reform, concentrates directly on
the unemployed.  To-date studies evaluating such changes have tended to rely on once
off special surveys33 or samples drawn from nationally representative samples.  A
problem with household surveys is that the samples of unemployed tend to be quite
small and they provide little information on dynamics.  These problems can be
overcome by establishing a panel database focusing on welfare dynamics.  The Joint
Unemployment and Vacancies Operating System (JUVOS) in the U.K could serve as a
benchmark.
The JUVOS cohort is a 5 percent sample of all computerised claims for unemployment
related benefits selected by reference to a claimant’s National Insurance Number.  Each
time a person with a relevant National Insurance Number makes a claim for
unemployment-related benefits their details are added to the cohort file.  The data are
used to inform policy decisions on employment and training, welfare and social
security.  The availability of JUVOS was crucial in establishing the long-run impact of
Restart discussed in section 3.
A limitation of JUVOS is the lack of information available on individuals.  One can
establish the age, gender and region of residence of the individual but no information is
available on education, training, family structure, or the destination of individuals who
leave the unemployment register.  Individuals who leave the register could have exited
to a job, a training scheme or out of the labour force.  Knowing which, could have
important policy implications.  Therefore, to allow such a database to reach its potential
it is important that future data developments should, where possible, facilitate linkages
to any proposed live register panel.  This would allow researchers to supplement
JUVOS information with more detailed information from external sources.  I
understand that there have been interdepartmental discussions about implementing a
longitudinal data set of this nature and any such moves should be encouraged.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper I examined some of the procedures available for analysing labour market
interventions and discussed the currently available data in this context.  The paper
outlines the identifying assumptions underlying each of the procedures and illustrates
some of the issues involved with analyses of welfare reform, reductions in standard
working hours and minimum wage changes.  In evaluating these techniques, the
tendency has been to view them as competing procedures.  A theme that emerges from
this paper, however, is that often these approaches can be complementary and when
used in tandem can be more effective than the sum of their parts.
This is evident in the discussion of the distributional issues involved in program
evaluation.  Well-designed experiments provide sharp estimates of the average
treatment effects but are relatively uninformative about the distributional consequences
of the program.  However, when combined with models of program participation the
distributional bounds associated with social experiments can be reduced substantially.
Likewise there exist many conventional regression approaches for dealing with sample
selection, including matching models, instrumental variables and two stage approaches.
Which approach is more appropriate depends on the nature of the selection bias.  As we
discussed in section 3 recent studies have shown how randomized data can be
combined with observational data to estimate the relative importance of various forms
of selection bias.
Careful evaluation of labour market interventions is essential if programmes are to work
effectively.  Conducting empirical evaluations requires choosing an identification
strategy suited to the problem at hand. There is no one estimator that is applicable in all
circumstances.  Choosing between alternative (groups of) estimator(s) is one important
element in developing an appropriate strategy.  Ultimately, this will be determined by
the questions to be answered, the economics of the problem and the availability of
appropriate data.
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Endnotes
1. For a more detailed discussion of vacancies in Ireland, see Williams and
Hughes (1999).
2. For a discussion of the economics of the minimum wage, see Dolado et al.
(1996).
3. This section of the paper follows closely the exposition provided in Heckman,
LaLonde and Smith (1999).
4. The results of this latter study are summarised in Robinson (1995).
5. An example of randomisation biases arises when the process of
experimentation alters individual behaviour.  Such affects are commonly called
Hawthorne effects.  For a discussion of the original Hawthorne experiments see
Franke and Kaul (1978).
6. The randomisation procedure was based on National Insurance numbers.
7. Since members of the control group received a Restart interview if they were
continuously unemployed for 1 year the Restart experiment actually measures
the impact of postponing search assistance and work search tests by 6 months.
8. See for example Robinson (1995) and Disney et al. (1992).
9. In recent years the Irish government have introduced changes to the Irish
benefit system, which incorporate elements of the Restart scheme.  The most
notable of these has been the Employment Action Plan, which commenced on
September 1st 1998.  From that date persons aged under 25 who reach six
months on the live-register are referred by the Department of Social
Community and Family Affairs for interview with FAS.  To-date of the
26,0000 called for interview, approximately 70 percent are no longer signing
on the Live Register.  While the threat component of the scheme seems to be
having an effect, it is unfortunate that the counselling and search assistance
component of Restart does not seem to have been as well developed.
10. Even if subjects drop out, Heckman, Smith and Taber (1998) have shown that
experimental data can still be used to estimate the impact of the treatment on
the treated under plausible assumptions provided one could observe the
proportion of dropouts.
11. This is somewhat true of the Restart experiment discussed above.  However,
Dolton and O’Neill (2002) attempt to assess the relative importance of the
work-test and job-search assistance components of Restart.
12. Although it is difficult to analyse participation issues using the experimental
approach one recent study by Card, Robins and Lin (1997) uses the approach
to evaluate whether targeted incentives to leave welfare can increase
participation welfare.
13. In some cases the difference in difference estimator may be extended to allow
for the possibility of time-varying affects – the so-called difference-in-
difference-in-difference estimator (Meyer 1995).
14. These studies have formed an important component of a larger debate on the
overall consequences of minimum wages on employment, see, for example,
Neumark and Wascher (1997) and the response by Card and Krueger (1997).
15. This works draws heavily on research by Feehan (1999).
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16. In the evaluation literature this model is often called the common coefficient
model or the endogenous dummy variable model (Heckman, 1978).
17. See for example the discussion in Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996a, 1996b)
and Heckman (1996).
18. This model can be modified to take account of heterogeneous returns, which
allows for the estimation of parameters other than the average treatment effects
(see, for example, Bjorklund and Moffitt (1987)).  Other extensions of the
Heckman approach are discussed in Vella (1998).  These include approaches
that maintain (8.1)-(8.3) but relax the distributional and functional form
assumptions and studies that extend the model in (8.1)-(8.3) to include
individual specific effects.  These latter models require panel data (see, for
example, Nijman and Verbeek (1992).  Despite these extensions, the model
outlined in (8.1)-(8.3) is still the most commonly estimated model in works
using this approach.
19. For a discussion of random coefficient models, see Swamy et al. (1988a,
1998b, 1989).
20. For a discussion of some other models that are not suited to the traditional two
step approach, see Maddala (1983) and Vella (1999).
21. In this section I will focus on the usefulness of current data for evaluations of
labour market interventions.  However, the availability of micro data plays an
important role in evolution of labour economics in general (Rosen, 1990).  The
current and continuing availability of micro data is to be welcomed and will
help develop our understanding of many labour market issues, including the
determinants of labour supply, skill shortages, wage differentials, inequality
and unemployment.
22. In the past, staff at the CSO have agreed to run specific programs on individual
data. However, this places an extra burden on the CSO staff and often several
runs may be needed before a researcher decides on an appropriate
specification.
23. The Labour Force Survey was replaced by the Quarterly National Household
Survey in 1997.  I will discuss these data in more detail later.
24. The main effect of these changes has been to elicit more information on part-
time employment (reference is 21st July 1999 CSO Press Release).
25. The availability of matched data also provides researchers with access to a
range of estimators based on panel data that are not discussed in this paper. For
a discussion of these estimators, see Vella (1999).
26. For a general description of the research carried out by the ESRI using these
data, see ESRI (1999).
27. This finding seems to differ from that reported by Deloitte & Touche and
Murphy . However given the different approaches adopted in these studies
comparing the results is not straightforward.  We can get some idea of the
differences using the fact that that O’Connell’s study (Table 4) predicts the
probability of a single male aged 25-39 with no qualifications and unemployed
less than 6 months in 1994 who participated in a CE scheme was 30 percent.
For a similar individual not on a CE scheme the probability is 27 percent.  The
average estimates across all individuals in the DTM study (Table 6.21) are 30.6
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percent and 23.7 percent respectively.  The fact that DTM do not report
standard errors complicates the comparison.
28. For a related discussion see Wagner (1998).
29. See for example the papers by Neumark and Wascher (1997) and Card and
Krueger (1997).
30. For a more technical discussion of the survey design see Nolan, O’Neill and
Williams (1999).
31. The address for this website is http://www.niesr.ac.uk/niesr/wers98/.  This
website also contains downloadable versions of the questionnaires used in the
survey.
32. For a discussion of possible data access provisions being discussed within the
U.S Bureau of Labor Statistics, see Manser (1997).
33. See, for example, O’Connell and McGinity (1997).
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DISCUSSION
Mr. Peter Malone:  I very much welcome Donal O’Neill’s paper and am pleased to
propose a vote of thanks to him.  I found the paper very enlightening.  I would like
to give you some of my own perspectives as Managing Director of Jurys Doyle
Hotel Group, as a member of the Minimum Wage Commission and as a member of
the Review Body of Pay in the Higher Civil Service.
Firstly, the minimum wage debate.  I must admit to being confused by the external
views given during the Commission’s deliberations and after the minimum wage
rate was agreed.  A number of economists said that this would be bad for the
economy.  Many businesses said that they would lose business, profits and, as a
result, jobs.  The main reason that I was confused about these views was that I was
at the coal-face of a business that employs over 1,000 people and I knew how hard it
was to attract and retain staff.  I felt strongly that looking forward we needed to
establish a minimum rate in order to secure an employment platform for business.
Two years on, we’re talking about bringing in thousands of workers from abroad!
This point was emphasised in Donal’s paper where he made the case about New
Jersey and Pennsylvania which showed that no jobs were lost when the minimum
wage was brought into one state.  This, and other examples, underpins in my view,
the case here in Ireland and I am confident that the harbingers of doom will be
proven wrong.
Donal didn’t cover wage agreements in his paper.  However, I am sure that the
single most important influence on our economic well being, on job creation and on
the improving working environment has been the series of wage agreements agreed
with the social partners and employees by successive governments.  In my job over
the past eleven years, I have made approximately 75 presentations to fund managers
and investment analysts in the UK, Europe and the USA.  Each year, the one
element that has most impressed international investors has been our series of
national agreements.  The impact of this “partnership” approach in my view was
even more influential than market intervention.
Finally, some comments on the Review Body on Pay in the Higher Civil Service.  I
am fearful that we may lose very many good public servants to the private sector
due to the disparity between remuneration panels.  If we do not pay and are not seen
to pay our leading public servants well, then people will not be attracted into some
of the most influential positions in this country.  We have been well served and it is
imperative, in my view, that we continue to attract high calibre people who have the
genuine interests of the nation at heart but who can expect to be remunerated in line
with their responsibility and capability.
Donal, many thanks for your research, your interesting and challenging paper and
for giving us an insight into your deliberations.
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Dr. Philip O’Connell:  I wish to begin my response by congratulating Donal on
winning the prestigious Barrington Prize.  Donal has contributed a paper which is
very important, useful, and also, I believe particularly timely.
I believe the paper is timely because with the dramatic improvement in labour
market conditions in resent years there is a tendency to assume that unemployment
is a problem of the past.  Arguably, however, labour market interventions may be as
important in good times as in bad.  In the Scandinavian countries where active
labour market policies (ALMPs) were first developed, such policies were regarded
as a key elements of stabilising, structural and distributional policies.  ALMPs could
promote structural change, or at least mitigate its effects, by facilitating the
reallocation of labour between sectors.  During periods of recession, ALMPs have
the potential to redistribute employment opportunities to the less advantaged in the
labour market, while during expansionary periods, such as that being experienced in
Ireland in recent years, ALMPs may increase labour supply and reduce labour and
skills shortages.  Such beneficial effects of ALMPs presume, of course that the
programmes are effective, that is that they bring about an increase in the
employment chances of their participants.  So from a public policy point of view it is
always important to assess the effectiveness of programmes, and, of course, to do so
rigorously.
The paper is important because its sets out and discusses the methodological issues
confronting the rigorous evaluation of the impact of labour market interventions.
This is an important issue because there is a scarcity of rigour in the evaluation field.
In Ireland, as in many other European countries, the practice of monitoring and
evaluating public interventions, partly under the influence of the European
Commission, has meant that there has been a substantial expansion in the number of
programme evaluations conducted.  Unfortunately, with some exceptions, this
increase in quantity has not been matched with an increase in quality.  Too often
evaluations consist of assessments of the degree of satisfaction felt by programme
participants, or of raw placement indicators, if the objective of a programme is to
enhance the participants’ employment prospects.
It is now well established that such indicators represent a poor basis for assessing the
effectiveness of programmes because they tell us nothing about the ‘counter-factual’
– what might have been the outcome had the participant not undertaken the
programme.  This paper brings out these issues very well and proceeds to a very
useful exposition of methodological issues in taking account of relevant variables
which can influence the outcome of programmes.  This also includes the often
difficult problem of selection bias, where unobserved variables can influence both
participation in a programme and outcomes, such as employment or earnings, and
can therefore bias evaluation results.
Having discussed best practice in programme evaluation in the international
literature, the paper then turns to a discussion of available data for programme
evaluation in Ireland, and of how such data might be improved.  This is a useful
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contribution, although it would also be useful to see a more elaborate discussion of
the development of evaluation research in Ireland.  Such a discussion might examine
the evolution of evaluations of programmes, drawing on the work of Breen (1991),
Breen and Halpin (1909), O’Connell and McGinnitty (1997), O’Connell (1999) and
Deloitte and Touche and Murphy (1998), to assess the strengths and weaknesses of
Irish research and to identify the gaps and further research needs in the Irish context.
In closing, I would like to recommend this paper to all those with an interest in
labour market interventions, but particularly to policy makers and to those
undertaking, or indeed, commissioning, research on labour market interventions.
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